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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

-------------------------------------------------------------MARIUS BURKE, JR.
Plaintiff and Respondent

-vs-

No. 18033

NORMAN FARRELL
Defendant and Appellant

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Appeal from the Judgment of the Second Judicial District
Court in and for Weber County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Ronald

o.

Hyde, Judge, presiding.

HERWIG GLANDER
466 East 500 South, Suite 101
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111
Telephone: 364-9573
Attorney for Respondent-Plaintiff

DALE E. STRATFORD
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

-----------------------------------------------------------MARIUS BURKE, JR.
Plaintiff and Respondent
-vs-

No. 18033

NORMAN FARRELL
Defendant and Appellant

-----------------------------------------------------------BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff/Respondent brought this matter in equity,
demanding to have adjudged and decreed the relationship between Defendant/Appellant and Plaintiff/Respondent in a certain business entitled

11

Fairfield Services", and to have

Defendant/Appellant declared sole proprietor of said business
during a certain period of time and to have determined the
liabilities of the parties to each other and to third parties
arising out of the operation of said business by Defendant/
Appellant and subsequent take-over of said business by Plaintiff/Respondent.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On August 13,1981, the Honorable Ronald O. Hyde, District
Judge, of the Second Judicial District court in and for
Weber county, found that Appellant operated the business
entitled

"Fairfield Services" as sole proprietor during the

period from July 1, 1978 through December 31, 1979, and that
the parties were no partners during said period; that Respondent was entitled to possession of the business entitled "Fairfield Services"; that Appellant had abandoned

his interest
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in "Fairfield Enterprises"; that Appellant had no further
interest in a limited partnership entitled "Fairfield Enterprises"; that Appellant is liable for all unpaid liabilities
which the business incurred during the period in question;
and based on the accounting of all debits and credits between
the parties, Respondent was ordered to pay the sum of $10,565.51
to Appellant or for his benefit to the creditors of the business "Fairfield_Services".
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the lower court's Judgment and Order.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about June 1, 1978, Respondent purchased certain
premises upon which a service station business entitled
11

Fairf ield Services" was conducted. Subsequent thereto, Respond-

ent formed a limited partnership entitled "Fairfield Enterprises", transferred said premises to said limited partnership.
Before these occurrences Appellant and Respondent had known
each other for some time and had discussed the purchase of
the property and operation of the service station. rt has been
the general understanding between them that Respondent would
buy the property and Appellant would operate the service station
business - R.176,177.
During the month of June, 1978, Respondent helped Appellant
to get started in tl:e business and describes the relationship
between the parties during this transition period as a loose
type of partnership arrangement, R.75,76.

on er about July 1,

1978, the parties formalized their arrangement, pursuant to
their former understanding, whereby Respondent agreed to sell
-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to Appellant 50% of his interest in the limited partnership
"Fairfield Enterprises", the owner of the premises, against
certain installment payments over a period of 10 years, and
Appellant entered into a lease of the premises with "Fa.irf ield
Enterprises" as proprietor of the service station business,
which was to be operated by him on the premises and was entitled "Fairfield Services".
During the months April and May, 1979, Appellant experienced cash-flow problems in his service station business,
R. 206i Appellant approached Respondent with the problem and
Respondent agreed to help him out with a loan of $16,000 to
"Fa.irfield Services",which was to be paid back out of the
business proceeds; R 148. No other documents were executed or
agreements made concerning said loan.

(P Exhibit 12, 13).

Later, during the summer of 1979, Appellant suggested
to Respondent as general manager of "Fairfield Enterprises"
the feasibility to increase the size of the building. He
agreed to the addition of a cafe and a grocery store. After
completion of the

~ddition,

the premises were refinanced by

i'Fairf ield Services" and the rent raised.
Towards the end of 1979 the financial situation of the
business deterioratedi Appellant fell into arrears with payments to "Fairfield Enterprises", suppliers, taxes, and the
Respondent. Respondent examined the situation and found that
there was not enough cash-flow to keep the business operative.
R.77. The parties had a discussion and agreed that it would
be in the best interest of the business and the parties, if
Respondent would take over the business as per January 1, 1980;
R. 76, a solution preferable to having to close the business.

-3-
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The parties agreed that they would determine their
debits and credits against each other - starting inventory,
ending inventory, a.ccounts receivable, accounts paya.ble,
Appellant's installment payments towards his interest in
"Fairfield Enterprises", and others - and on the final balance Respondent would either pay to Appellant the difference
or vice-versa.. R. 95, 155-157.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
TO ALLOW ONE TO TAKE TITLE AS SECURITY FOR A LOAN
TO LATER EMBARK ON A SCHEME TO DEFRAUD ONE WHO
SOLICITED HIS SERVICES AS A LENDER IS ERROR.
Appellant based his argument on the law in Graham vs.
Street, 166 P.2d 524 (Utah, 1946). The facts in Graham vs.
Street

can be clearly distinguished from the facts as they

appear in this case. In Graham vs. Street one Siegel had
lead Graham and Street, two partners at that time, to believe
that he lend them money and they were owing money to him for
the purchase of a tractor, which he, in fact, had purchased
himself and to which he had taken title. The court observed:
When did Siegel change his intention to
treat the deal as his personally after
apparently starting out with papers made
to the Siegel Finance Company? All these
facts and others, when fitted together and
made to illuminate each other, lead us to
conclude that there was an intention on
Siegel's pa.rt to get control of the "cat",
which he knew he had led Graham to believe
he was financing for the partnership of
Graham and Street. By taking title himself
and the notes from Graham and Street, he
was in a. position to go either way what
-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

events would dictate to be to his interest.
If the tractor lost money, it would be a
loan. If it made money, it would be his
with a right to one third of the profits.
(page 535).
No such dual situation existed in this case.

It was

clear from the beginning to the end that Appellant owned
and operated the business "Fairfield Services", that "Fairfield Enterprises" owned the premises for which Appellant
paid rent and that the money infusion by Respondent was a
loan. During the months of April and May 1979, the business
"Fairfield Services", operated by Appellant, experienced
cash-flow problems. Appellant approached Respondent with
the problem and Respondent agreed to help out with a loan
of $16,000 in total with the understanding that it would be
paid back out of the profits of the business. R. 95, 96;
141, 142; 189, 190; R 198.
The confusion arises from the fact that Respondent in
his original summary of debits and credits pursuant to the
take-over agreement between the parties, tried to hold
Appellant personally responsible for his loan. The lower
court disallowed said claim and found it was a business
loan and since Respondent had come into possession of the
business, he had no right to claim said loan from Appellant
personally (see Memorandum Decision).
POINT II
THE BREACH OF A DUTY TO DISCLOSE BY THE
DOMINANT PARTY IN A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP
IS CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD.
The law as cited by Appellant is not disputed. However,
the court, in examining the record, will find no breach of
duty by Respondent. Appellant apparently refers to the reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-5Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

lationship of the parties as members of "Fairfield Enterprises", a limited partnership, in which Respondent was
the general partner and Appellant one limited partner. The
facts are, that Appellant knew that the service station was
first bought by Respondent personally and then transferred
into "Fairfield Enterprises", of which he was offered a
50% interest for payment of $25,000 over a period of 10 years,
which amounted to "half the payment on the gas station", R.178.
He testified, that the idea was for him to lease the station
and that he would also buy into the
partner, R. 177.

bu~iness

as a limited

He knew that his rent to "Fairfield Enter-

prises" was based on the mortgage payments, which "Fairfield
Enterprises" owed to the mortgageholder. R.196, 197.
Respondent testified that the accountant for
prises 11 did prepare an accounting. R. 11.

11

Fairf ield Enter-

Appellant himself

testified, that he never asked for an accounting, because it
was there and he had access to it. R. 207.

Appellant knew

how his total payrnents were allocated by Respondent and that
first rent would come out of it, then equipment leases, landlord's share of profits and last his installment payments
for his partnership interest in "Fairfield Enterprises".R.184
through

186~

R. 209, 210. Respondent informed Appellant of

his defaults. R. 76, 77.

He knew the value of his business

"Fairfield Services" at the time of the take-over and he
knew the value of "Fairfield Enterprises", he testified to it.
Ergo, on the facts as they appear in this case, Respondent did not violate any duty to disclose and Appellant
had knowledge of all material facts and no constructive fraud
may be found.
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The cases cited in support of Appellant's argument
are clearly distinguishable.
W. A. McMichael Construction co. vs. D. and
Inc.

w.

Properties,

356, So.2d 1115 (La. App., 1978). Therein a partner

intentionally and knowingly withheld information regarding
a business opportunity, which he subsequently appropriated
to himself. Plaintiff in this case testified that he would
not have sold his interest if he would.have known of the
business opportunity.
Renshaw v. Tracy Loan arid Trust co., 49 P.2d403
(Utah, 1935). The case holds, that on establishment of a
fiduciary relationship and transactions between parties
thereof, equity will presume fraud and place the burden of
proving good faith and fairness on the dominant party. And
further:
It is always a question, therefore, of
the actual relationship between the parties
that must be inquired into and not whether
the terms f iduciary
confidential or
"trust" can, with some degree of reason,
be applied to the relationship.
11

11

11

11

,

Further, the court in "Lewis vs. Schafer", 163 Okl. 94,
20 P.2d 1048, cited in the foregoing case, defines a confidential rela.tionship on which a court may base a presumption of fraud, as follows:
A confidential relation arises by reason
of kinship between the parties, or professional, business, or social relations
that would reasonably lead an ordinarily
prudent person in the management of his
affairs to repose that degree of confidence
in the defendant which largely results in
the substitution of the,will of the defendant for that of the plaintiff in material
matters involved in the transaction.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization-7provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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On the record of this case the court may find that
the actual relationship between the parties hereto may not
even justify the presumption of fraud. The relationship,
although formally general partner and limited partner, was
very close and most decisions were made together until the
fall-out during the last few months of 1979.
Also Blodgett vs. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 (Utah, 1978)
holds:
Breach of duty by the dominant party in
a confidential relationship may be regarded constructive fraud.
However, the court further elaborates:
Reasonable diligence on the part of the
trustee, where the trustor proclaims his
confusion about the meaning of the instruments he is asked to sign, may require
a full disclosure and explanation, particularly when the instruments impose a
heavier burden.
Nowhere in his testimony does Appellant claim to have
expressed confusion which remained unexplained by Respondent
or that by execution of certain documents a heavier burden
was imposed upon him than before and that he knew of.
POINT III
A COURT OF EQUITY SHOULD NOT ASSIST ONE IN
CIRCUMSTANCES HE HAS HIMSELF CREATED. A
PARTY STEPPED IN FRAUD SHOULD HAVE NO
EQUITABLE RELIEF.
On the record the court may not find fraud either intentional or by breach of a purported "confidential relationship".
Respondent did not create any of the circumstances leading
to his take-over of the business. Such circumstances were

-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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created by Appellant's mismanagement of the business "Fairfield Services" and his defaulting in his payment obligations.
On the record in this case before the court, the court
may find that no such relationship existed between the parties
that would justify the presumption of constructive fraud.
In any event, however, Respondent did not breach his duty to
disclose.
POINT IV
THE CHOICE OF REMEDY BELONGS TO THE VICTIM
OF THE FRAUD AND A CHOICE CANNOT BE FORCED
UPON HIM ..
Respondent was not defrauded and failed to establish
even constructive fraud, which under the theory

of the before

cited cases requires (1) a "confidential relationship" and
(2) a breach of duty.
Atkinson vs. Marquart,

541 P.2d 556 (Ar.iz., 1975),

which Appellant cites in support of Respondent's estimate
of the value holds in detail;
Owner may estimate value of his real or
personal property, whether he is qualified
as expert or not: the fact that owner may
not be expert goes to the weight of testimony, and not competency.
Respondent was not qualified as an expert. The case
further holds with regard to the issue of breach of fiduciary
duty:
A director does not breach his fiduciary
duty so long as he acts honestly and in
good faith and breaches no specific duty
owing to the corporation.
Respondent's action may be measured against this
holding and no breach of duty may be found.

-9-
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POINT V
IT IS ERROR TO FIND AN ABANDONMENT OF
PROPERTY BASED ON AN AGREEMENT PROCURED
BY FRAUD AND WHERE THE DEFRAUDED PARTY
DOES NOT KNOW THE TRUE VALUE OF WHAT HE
SUPPOSEDLY ABANDONS.
As a result of the discussions between the parties in
December 1979, Appellant abandoned his interest in the business entitled "Fairfield Services" - R.76 through 78 - on
the terms that "we would go through it and determine where
the debits and credits were and he would either be paying
me money or I would be paying him money". Plaintiff's testimony R.95, 155, 160, 162. Respondent was well aware of the
value of the business, of the accounts receivable, accounts
payable, inventory,although his figures were later proven
far too optimistic. Defendant's Exhibit 6, 7, and R. 214,
Respondent not only knew the value of the property that he
abandoned, but according to his testimony he also saw no other
way out of his predicament than turning it over to the Respondent. R. 197.
Regarding Appellant's interest in the limited partnership "Fairfield Enterprises", Respondent had informed him of
his default under the purchasing agreement before the takeover of the business, R. 233, and

Appell~nt

himself testified

that Respondent offered to return to him as credit the sum
of $2,300, which Appellant had paid toward the purchase of
his interest in "Fairfield Enterprises", the land owner. R.199.
Nowhere does the record show that Appellant objected to that
proposal. Respondent abandoned his interest in the limited
partnership for the credit of $2,300, which he had paid in.
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In the event the court cannot find abandonment, Appellant lost his interest in said partnership by defaulting on
his installment payments and cancellation in accordance
with the purchase agreement. He confirmed in his testimony
as correct, Plaintiff's Exhibit 9, showing his total payments
towards the purchase of his interest and his arrears. R.215.
Pursuant to the contract for the Sale of a Limited Partnership Agreement - Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 - Respondent cancelled
said agreement - Plaintiff's Exhibit 8 - and was entitled
to do so.
POINT VI
IT IS NOT REQUIRED THAT A SERIES OF TRANSACTIONS SO CLOSELY RELATED IN TIME AND FACT
TO BE GROUPED AND COMPARTMENTALIZED TO
SEPARATE THEIR LEGAL EFFECT.
The record repeatedly shows that Appellant understood
and clearly knew the different business entities, their
relations to each other and his relation to either one of
them. Appellant's testimony:

R. 176:

A. He was saying that he was thinking of
buying a service-station and I would be
interested in running it.

R. 177:

Q. was this put to you that he would buy it,
or that both of you were buying it, or what
were you both going to do with this gas
station?
A. Okay, the idea was to lease it and also
to buy into the business as a partner.

R.

201:

A. Yes, he told me that he would buy it and
then I would buy into the business, into
the company, which was "Fairfield Enterprises".

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
-11Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Also R.201
R. 204, 205: Q. But you were aware that you, Norman
Farrell, had a lease with a landlord,
namely Fairfield Enterprises, who owns
the business, is that right?
A. Right, and that's the way I

looked at

it.

Q. very good. So there were two levels.
You as the tenant and
prises as the

11

landlord~

Fairfield Enteris that correct?

A. Right.

Q. And you were acquiring a fifty % interest
in the landlord, "is that correct 11 ?
A. That is right.
Appellant would like to see all entities treated as one
but they were distinct and the court ma.y not make up a relationship between the parties that did not exist and the
parties did not intent.
The record shows that Respondent did not deprive Appellant
of the fruits of his labor. The fact is, that Appellant assumed
a normal business risk by opera.ting "Fairfield Services" and
failed. He never had a clear picture of the actual profit
situation. He looked at the business on a cash-flow basis.
R. 206. When questioned about the improvement of the business
under his management, he testified that the buildup of his
business consisted of an increase in accounts receivables
from $8,000 to $33,000 over a six months period. At the same
time he admits that an increase in accounts receivable does
not actually reflect the health of a business, R. 206, and
that as a result of the increase in accounts receivable he
got into a cash-flow problem. R. 190. In the first incident
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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in April/May 1979 this problem was solved by an infusion
of $16,000 by Respondent. The situation repeated itself
towards the end of the year - accounts payable $38,112.95;
accounts receivable $16,744.99 - and when no additional working capital could be obtained because Respondent was financially exhausted, he saw no other way out than turning the
business over to Respondent instead of closing it down.
R. 197. He did not leave the business empty-handed as he
argues. Mr. West, the accountant during part of the period
of Appellant's operation of the business, testified on rebuttal that Appellant, for example, drew in October-November
basically $1,900 a month - $1,000 into savings, $900 direct
draw - and draws in September and each of the months of
approximately $1,900 a month. R. 227, 228.

Appellant

was

credited for his work done on the improvements to the premises
for material and labor. R. 208. Respondent bought a home
during the period in question and testifies to its financing
as follows: R. 212. Respondent clearly drew money from the
business for the purchase of his

home~

Q. Now when you bought that house you have testif ied to, did you actually buy it, your home?
A. With my money?

Q. Did you actually buy it?
A. Right.

Q. Okay - and you said you had no money for the
down-payment?
A. At that timei noc..

Q. where did you get the money for the down-payment?
A. I was expecting all the accounts receivable to
come back, you know, in the later months. And
I could foresee that I had a certain amount of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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money that I could use, considering that ·I
didn't get a pay-check every year, every week
you

know~

so I thought to myself, well this

could be a pay-check to me.
What goodies did Respondent get when he took over the
business "Fairfield Services" and Appellant abandoned his
interest in the limited partnership "Fairfield Enterprises?"
He, through his interest in "Fairfield Enterprises", again
became the full owner of the premises which he had bought
and for which he had made the total down-payment in the
first place. For the improvement a higher mortgage was assumed.
Material and labor had been supplied by his company. For
his small contribution to the improvements Appellant was
credited. The business showed $16,744.99 accounts receivable,
of which only about $12,000 were collectible, against
$38,112.95 accounts payable, $24,764.80 inventory, and considerable tax liabilities. After his take-over he had to
invest an additional $50,000 to keep the business afloat.
R. 162.
POINT VII
IT IS THE PREROGATIVE OF THE FACT FINDER
TO HEAR EVIDENCE, MAKE FINDINGS OF FACTS
AND DRAW INFRENCES AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
THEREFROM TO SUPPORT ITS JUDGMENT.
The decision of the lower court is based on its finqings
of fact and conclusions of law and that it is its prerogative. Blodgett vs. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 (Utah, 1978).
Justice Crockett in the same case opines further:
that we should not presume to evaluate
the evidence, but that should be done
at trial.
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It is only:
When evidence is non-conflicting and
undisputed and permits only one conclusion, finding or conclusion by trial
court contrary thereto is not binding
on appeal, and, where undisputed facts
are conclusive of issue between parties,
reviewing court will order judgment
entered as required by facts and law.
(see Woodmar vs. Knight, 380P.2d 222,
Idaho,1963).
C 0 N C L U S I 0 N
The Judgment and order of the lower court should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

HERW
At to

~·~
flor Respondent
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